It was a small but critical flaw in an otherwise very robust facility. The tsunami took out the pumps/diesel generators that provided emergency power to the cooling system. The earthquake didn't kill the plant, the Tsunami technically didn't take it out. And really, the nature of the failure was along the lines of 'Small Thermal Exhaust Port' in terms of weakness. The panel concluded that a culture of complacency about nuclear safety and poor crisis management led to the nuclear disaster.Ĭonsidering the nature of the Fukishima disaster, the plant still took a colossus of a natural disaster to take down. The panel's report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis-command disarray caused by the government and Tepco, and possible excess meddling on the part of the prime minister's office in the early stage of the crisis. TEPCO had even weighed in on a report about earthquake risk and asked the government to play down the likelihood of a tsunami in the region, the report said. and were not aware that measures to avoid the worst situation were actually full of holes," the government panel said in its final report. "The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur. The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |